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This article appears in the following International Journal of Transitional Justice issue: Special Issue: Whose Justice? Global and Local Approaches to Transitional Justice [View the issue table of contents]
Engaging Diasporas in Truth Commissions: Lessons from the Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission Diaspora Project
* The Advocates for Human Rights, International Justice, Minneapolis, USA. Email: lyoung{at}advrights.org
** The Advocates for Human Rights, Research, Minneapolis, USA. Email: rpark{at}advrights.org
| Abstract |
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (LTRC) was the first of its kind to include a diaspora population in all aspects of the truth commission process. The LTRC partnered with a US-based human rights organization, The Advocates for Human Rights (The Advocates), to facilitate diaspora involvement in outreach, statement taking, report writing and the first official public hearings of a truth commission ever held in a diaspora. This article, written by two staff members from The Advocates who were intimately involved in all phases of the LTRC Diaspora Project, describes the rationale for diaspora involvement in the Liberian case, provides an overview of the outcomes of and lessons learned from the Liberia TRC Diaspora Project and discusses legal and policy reasons why other truth commissions and transitional justice processes should consider a strategy for engaging diaspora populations in their work.
| Introduction |
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (LTRC) completed its statutory mandate in June 2009. As the most recent truth commission to complete its work, it will be the subject of much analysis and critique. This article provides insight into a part of the LTRC process – its Diaspora Project – to pose questions and possibilities related to engagement of diaspora populations for future truth commissions.
Both authors of this article were involved in all aspects of the LTRC Diaspora Project. As non-Liberian staff of a US-based nongovernmental organization (NGO), we present a practitioners perspective. The lasting impact of the LTRC process, including its diaspora component, will be in contention for some time as the LTRC report and recommendations settle into the Liberian political landscape. Accordingly, this article does not present a definitive statement on the success or failure of any component of the LTRC process. Instead, we document the emergence of an innovation in truth commissions that was a response to Liberia's particular relationship with its diaspora. Although the LTRC Diaspora Project developed in unique ways in each of the local areas where it operated, we argue that it has global implications for consideration of diaspora groups in transitional justice from both a legal and policy perspective.
Background: The Liberia TRC Diaspora Project
From 1979 until 2003, the Liberian people suffered a coup détat, military rule and two civil wars that resulted in egregious violations of human rights and mass displacement. The LTRC was negotiated and agreed upon in the August 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement and was enacted into law by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly in 2005. The LTRC was established to promote national peace, security, unity and reconciliation, and to make it possible to hold perpetrators accountable for gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law that occurred in Liberia between January 1979 and October 2003.1 President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf inaugurated the LTRC in February 2006, appointing nine commissioners.
From the outset the LTRC confronted many of the challenges that other TRCs have faced: an expansive mandate and short operational timeframe; logistical, staffing and fundraising difficulties; and external criticism and internal conflict.2 In spite of these challenges, the LTRC was an innovator among truth commissions in at least one important respect – its systematic inclusion of the diaspora.3
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 780,000 Liberians fled across an international border in 1996 alone, becoming refugees.4 The exodus fleeing the fighting also swelled existing – and created new – Liberian diaspora communities around the world. In 2007, approximately 40,000 Liberians were residing in the Buduburam refugee settlement outside Accra, Ghana;5 many had been there for 17 years. In the US, estimates of the size of the Liberian diaspora vary, from tens to hundreds of thousands.6 Diaspora researcher Stephen Lubkemann estimates there are between 26,000 and 31,500 Liberians in the US.7 Other researchers put the number at well over 39,000.8 The number of Liberians in the UK is even more difficult to estimate.9
As the LTRC began its work in Liberia, it made a decision to systematically engage the diaspora, particularly those Liberians residing in the US. In 2006, the LTRC approached The Advocates for Human Rights (The Advocates), an NGO headquartered in Minnesota, to seek assistance for diaspora engagement.10 Minnesota is home to one of the largest Liberian communities outside of West Africa. In addition to this strategic location, the LTRC approached The Advocates for another reason. Lingering ethnic and political fractures in the Liberian diaspora led the LTRC to engage a non-Liberian organization that would be viewed in the community as a neutral convener11 for truth-telling and reconciliation. The LTRC ultimately established a Diaspora Committee, chaired by Commissioner Massa Washington, who had fled the conflict and was residing in the US at the time of her appointment to the LTRC.
The LTRC Diaspora Project was carried out through a partnership between the LTRC and The Advocates. During its period of operation, the LTRC Diaspora Project gathered 1,63112 statements from Liberians living in the US, the UK and Ghana, accounting for more than 9 percent of the total LTRC statements gathered. More than 80 percent of diaspora statements came from Liberians in the Buduburam refugee settlement in Ghana.13 The project also held five days of public hearings in St. Paul, Minnesota, in June 2008, during which 31 witnesses from 10 US states testified before the entire Commission. This work was carried out with assistance from more than 800 volunteers in the US and UK who provided pro bono services including statement taking, legal consultation, psychological counseling, translation, research, transcription, videography and outreach. Institutions such as law firms provided in-kind contributions of administrative support and technical assistance. In June 2009, The Advocates made public its final report in conjunction with the release of the LTRC's final report.
Why the LTRC Wanted to Engage the Diaspora
The LTRC recognized that several aspects of the Liberian context made involvement of the diaspora a critical component of the truth and reconciliation process in Liberia. Liberia's long-standing relationship with the US and the role played by the US during the conflict – both actions and omissions – provided a framework for examining the conflict.14 Also, key witnesses, alleged perpetrators, and other conflict actors were known to be residing in the diaspora, primarily in the US, but also in Europe and West Africa, and there was a widespread belief that the diaspora had played a critical role in fomenting and funding the conflict.15 Finally, the potential for harnessing diaspora resources was a further motivating factor for the LTRC. Commissioners expressed the hope that diaspora engagement could rally additional resources for reparations and development. Indeed, in its final report, the LTRC recommended that Liberians in the diaspora each contribute at least US$1.00 monthly to the Reparations Trust Fund as the beginning of its contribution as citizens of Liberia to the economic and social development of their motherland.16
Why The Advocates for Human Rights Became Involved
The Advocates undertook the Diaspora Project primarily because the group believed that Liberians outside of their home country were important constituents of the LTRC process. In addition, The Advocates believed that documenting violations related to flight, refugee life and immigration could be an important part of a truth commission process. Moreover, the group had ready access to professional volunteers and to legal assistance should complications have arisen as a result of operating such a project in the diaspora context.
For many years, The Advocates has provided free legal services to Liberian asylum-seekers in Minnesota. Consequently, the organization had an extensive understanding of the Liberian conflict, the human rights violations and country conditions, as well as established relationships with Liberian community members. Because the group had worked in the Liberian diaspora for decades, it was clear to The Advocates staff that no Liberian, regardless of why he or she left the country, was unaffected by the conflict. The Advocates also believed that the US had a particular responsibility to Liberia based on historical connections. Moreover, the LTRC process presented an opportunity to raise awareness in the US about Liberia and the role the US played in the conflict.
Despite The Advocates long relationship with the Liberian community, engaging a non-Liberian organization in a fundamentally Liberian process was not without problems. Although the group was seen as neutral in relation to the Liberian conflict itself, it was nevertheless a non-Liberian organization that some community members saw as benefiting from a Liberian process. The Advocates convened a Liberian community advisory committee to provide input and consultation to the LTRC Diaspora Project and hired a Liberian staff member for the project. Even so, questions remained. Maintaining transparency about the project's funding and reiterating that the diaspora component received no funding from the LTRC helped dispel some skepticism. Although the purpose of The Advocates involvement was to bring more people into the process, it is possible that some were dissuaded from participating because the project was led by a non-Liberian entity. On the other hand, it is also clear that some statement givers felt more comfortable telling their stories for exactly this reason.
Maintaining a three-year working relationship with the LTRC when The Advocates had no in-country presence in Liberia was also a challenge. Communication infrastructure in Liberia was unreliable, especially early on, and the transportation of original or confidential documents could be a difficult endeavor. If anything, these challenges demonstrate the importance of addressing these issues prior to engaging an international implementing partner.
Operation and Outcomes of the LTRC Diaspora Project
The Advocates and the LTRC signed a memorandum of understanding autho- rizing The Advocates to implement the LTRC's work in the diaspora.17 The Advocates also agreed to take on the project without any monetary remuneration from the LTRC, and instead secured of their own accord private donor and foundation funding to cover staff time and program expenses. Volunteers and in-kind donations were also used to accomplish much of the work. During the three years of the project, The Advocates procured more than US$10.5 million in pro bono services and in-kind contributions for the LTRC.
From June 2006 until June 2009 The Advocates mirrored, to the extent possible, the LTRC process in the diaspora. The LTRC Diaspora Project conducted outreach in communities around the US, adopting mechanisms to fit the diaspora context.18 As word spread, more diaspora communities expressed interest in participating. Ultimately, volunteer statement takers gathered statements from Liberians in 11 US cities, the UK and the Buduburam refugee settlement in Ghana. All statements were transmitted to Liberia to become part of the LTRC's official statement pool.19 As noted above, diaspora public hearings were also held in the US and the Diaspora Project final report, A House with Two Rooms, was made public in June 2009.20
Despite mirroring the process in Liberia to the extent possible, the diaspora process necessarily was different so as to address distinctive legal considerations. Legal protections for statement givers established as part of the LTRC statute, such as use immunity, did not protect individuals in the diaspora.21 Prior to beginning statement taking, The Advocates developed detailed procedures to inform diaspora statement givers of the potential risks of participation, such as prosecution or negative immigration consequences in the US based on admission of crimes committed in Liberia. All statement givers were required to give informed consent before providing any information to the LTRC and were also offered the option of giving an anonymous statement. Moreover, The Advocates offered pre-statement referrals to a pro bono immigration or criminal law attorney for any statement giver with concerns about the legal implications of providing a statement. Public hearing witnesses also had the option of testifying in camera before the commissioners to preserve anonymity.
Context for the Emergence of the LTRC Diaspora Project Model
In Liberia, the LTRC encountered resistance from international partners related to its engagement of the diaspora. Some expressed the view that the TRC was stretched too thin and that adding another component to an already massive mandate would be problematic. Others seemed concerned that the Diaspora Project would serve as an excuse for commissioners to spend time in the US, detracting from in-country work. Because the LTRC's mandate lacked a provision for a diaspora component, others desired that no funding be allocated to diaspora work. These constraints shaped the LTRC's strategy in working with a partner that could mobilize volunteers and in-kind support.
In the US and the UK, all administrative, logistic and labor support was either donated or carried out by The Advocates staff and volunteers. Often, with the exception of the diaspora public hearings, commissioners were in the US on other business and could add on Diaspora Project work during their travels. In Ghana, the model was more mixed. The LTRC secured some funding to support statement taking among refugees in Ghana, although none of those funds went to The Advocates. More than 20 volunteers recruited by The Advocates covered their own expenses to take statements in Ghana. The Advocates staff and volunteers worked alongside two TRC staff members and one commissioner to pilot statement taking in the Buduburam refugee settlement in May 2007. The LTRC and The Advocates later trained approximately 10 refugees residing in Buduburam to take statements; they received a small stipend for their work, and the statements they took were included in The Advocates analysis. The Advocates staff and volunteers took statements alongside these in-camp statement takers for two weeks in October 2007. In-camp statement takers gathered approximately half of the statements from Buduburam over a period of a few months, while The Advocates staff and volunteers gathered the other half during their three weeks in Buduburam.
The resistance that the LTRC encountered relative to the Diaspora Project begs the question whether diaspora engagement should be a part of a transitional justice mechanism. We believe that the successful conclusion of the LTRC Diaspora Project provides a generally affirmative answer. Moreover, there is clearly wider interest in such inclusion. The Advocates has received inquiries from civil society groups in Kenya, Zimbabwe and the Somali diaspora about adapting the LTRC Diaspora Project model to their contexts.22 In the following sections, we discuss some of the theoretical and practical reasons why national actors might decide to incorporate diaspora involvement into a truth commission or other transitional justice process. First, however, we discuss the LTRC's efforts in the context of other diaspora engagement in transitional justice to provide insight for other nations considering such an initiative.
Diasporas in Transitional Justice Processes
As political, economic and technological factors shrink the world, it is clear that a nation-state bound by geographic borders is a limited and incomplete concept. Populations with origins in a particular region may physically reside anywhere on the globe, but still have a powerful impact on the economies, politics, and transitions in their home countries.
Migration researchers have drawn distinctions between different types of diasporas, describing victim, labor, imperial, trade and cultural diasporas.23 For example, victim diasporas are those who fled as refugees or asylees, whereas trade and labor diasporas are those who migrate for economic opportunity. In the context of the LTRC Diaspora Project, there was no distinction drawn between participants on the basis of why they had left Liberia: all were welcome to participate. Indeed, it was clear from narratives gathered in the US and the UK that the Liberian diaspora includes individuals who fall into all of these diaspora categories. Liberians left Liberia for many reasons: as part of a long-established labor migration pattern throughout West Africa,24 to pursue educational opportunities, to conduct business, because they had family connections outside of Liberia, and because they were forced to flee political persecution and human rights violations. The majority of individuals who narrated their stories to the LTRC Diaspora Project were refugees and asylees, either resettled or remaining in their country of first asylum.25 But even those who left Liberia initially as economic migrants or as students suddenly found themselves to be victims of the conflict, losing family members, property and support systems as fighting engulfed the country. Economic migrants told of losing contact with parents, children and siblings, sometimes for years. Liberian students living abroad described being trapped away from home, unable to return and without support because government scholarship programs were suspended or family members had lost everything.26
Diasporas have long played a role in movements to precipitate transition in nation states.27 Those who have been forced – or who have made the difficult choice – to flee a regime are those who often have the greatest interest in pushing forward a transition. There has been growing involvement of diaspora populations in truth commissions as well, culminating in the LTRC's systematic effort. For example, in the 1990s the Haitian diaspora community was the primary driver of a truth commission in that country, actually creating a proposal outlining the parameters for the Commission's activities.28 Truth commissions in East Timor and Sierra Leone included programs to engage refugee populations in neighboring countries. One function of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (CAVR) was interviewing returning refugees from West Timor, although serious concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of this process.29 The Sierra Leone TRC reported an unsuccessful attempt to reach out to its diaspora population through a partnership with the ministry of foreign affairs, but had more success in reaching refugee populations through UNHCR funding and facilitation.30 The Sierra Leone TRC's final report stated that a total of 175 statements were taken from refugees in Ghana, Gambia, Nigeria and Guinea.31
These examples demonstrate the varied ways in which nationals living outside state borders have participated in truth commission processes – as conceivers of the process, statement givers in the data collection process, advocates for justice or, as in the LTRC case, as participants in all phases. The model for engaging a diaspora group emerges in the context of the legal and political framework in the home country. In the context of Liberia, this framework included a perception of the diaspora as a conflict actor, skepticism from international partners and donors, and a partner that could undertake a project without LTRC funding by using significant volunteer resources. Whatever the model, states in transition will consider various legal and policy arguments, as addressed in the following sections, to help inform a diaspora engagement strategy.
| International Legal Considerations Relative to Diaspora Participation |
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A prime motivator for states undertaking transitional justice processes is to meet their international legal obligations to investigate human rights violations, bring perpetrators to justice and provide reparations to victims.32 These obligations derive from the rights enshrined in international treaties, including the Geneva Conventions, which are the foundation for the right to truth in international law,33 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 2 of which enshrines the right to a remedy for human rights violations. Other instruments, such as the UN's Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles and Guidelines),34 while not binding, nevertheless provide a guiding framework for vindicating those rights.
The rights that states most often seek to vindicate through truth commissions – specifically the right to an investigation, the right to know and the right to reparations – are rights of victims. This is the fundamental distinction between truth commissions and prosecutorial processes. Truth commissions are victim-centered, focused on information and redress, whereas prosecutions are perpetrator-centered and focused on punishment.35 It is a valid question whether members of diaspora populations can be considered victims, as this consideration has great bearing on whether states have an obligation to include diaspora groups during a national truth commission process. We do not attempt to answer this question definitively here, but do present some analysis as it relates to the Liberian case for consideration and further inquiry.
For the purpose of truth commissions, and for the purpose of diaspora participation, it is important to consider victims as those who have an entitlement to information about, or reparation as a result of, human rights violations. The Basic Principles and Guidelines define victims as
persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law.36
Family members, dependents and those who suffered harm while seeking to help victims also constitute victims.37 There is no geographic or residency component in this definition. Indeed, laws such as the US Alien Tort Claims Act recognize that those outside the borders of a nation state may remain victims with claims against state actors.
As noted above, the composition of diaspora populations is variable. Refugees are the easiest to categorize as a victim group with likely entitlement to participation in transitional justice processes. But the people in migration flows rarely fall easily into simple categories of economic migrant, refugee or perpetrator. For example, an individual who arrived in the US as a student might later apply for asylum, or decide not to return out of fear, but never obtain legal classification as an asylee or a refugee. A merchant who had traditionally moved freely between Liberia and other West African countries may have stayed in Ghana once the war started but never been classified as a refugee. These are some of the individuals who make up the diaspora, in contrast to a refugee population. Transitional justice processes that focus only on officially defined refugee populations miss this important group, who are nevertheless victims of the conflict.
LTRC statements and public hearings testimony reveal that no matter how or why Liberians left Liberia, the majority are victims in the sense that they are entitled to information about, or reparations as a result of, the human rights violations that took place in Liberia. Anecdotal and statistical evidence demonstrates that the majority of statement givers in the diaspora were direct victims.38 The 1,165 diaspora statements in the LTRC's data analysis include information about 6,398 victims and 10,154 human rights violations.39 These individuals reported being the direct target of grievous harm, including extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, sexual violence, forced recruitment, forced labor, discrimination, displacement and other abuses. The remainder of those in the diaspora who gave statements to the TRC were indirect victims, having lost family members or property, or having experienced other effects as a result of the conflict, such as forgoing education in order to work to support relatives in Liberia.
It is our contention that the Liberian diaspora is hardly unique among postconflict diasporas. Accordingly, states in transition should consider the composition of their diasporas with an eye toward evaluating whether they have the right to know the fate of family members, the right to know the circumstances, causes and conditions surrounding violations of human rights, and the right to reparation, as discussed below.
The Right to Know the Fate of the Family
Victims, regardless of where they reside, are entitled to know the fate of their family members.40 International jurisprudence has recognized the agony of not knowing the fate of a family member as tantamount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.41 For many Liberians, both in the diaspora and at home, the fate and whereabouts of family members remain unresolved. The conflict resulted not only in widespread deaths, but also in massive displacement and separation of families. The fighting displaced approximately one-third of Liberia's population, many of whom fled to other areas within Liberia, to other West African countries or to countries beyond the African continent.42 Furthermore, the forced recruitment of child soldiers and bush wives exacerbated the separation of individuals from their families. Factions forcibly recruited or abducted thousands of children – a practice that continued into the Taylor administration and second civil war – during attacks, from refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camps, and even en route to or from school.43 Abductions of women and girls were also common, as fighting factions used these bush wives as sex slaves and laborers. Often, the whereabouts and the fate of these individuals were or remain unknown for Liberians both in-country and in the diaspora.
It was clear during the LTRC Diaspora Project that some participants entered the process hoping the LTRC would assist them in finding lost relatives or in gathering information about the circumstances of a relative's death. A recommendation that emerged from the diaspora process was that resources should be allocated to ongoing family-tracing efforts. It remains unclear whether this recommendation, which was included in The Advocates final report to the LTRC,44 will ultimately be implemented.45
Although it is unknown whether TRC archives will ultimately be made available for family tracing, diaspora participation could in theory also vindicate the human rights of individuals who remained in-country. Like those back home, Liberians in the diaspora witnessed the horrific crimes that took place. In statements and during diaspora public hearings, participants related details of the deaths and abductions of others. In some cases, the victim's identity was unknown; but in other cases, the witness was able to recount the name of the victim. If future commissions do not include the voices of the diaspora, they risk losing an important resource in fulfilling the right to know the fate and whereabouts of family.
The Right to Know the Circumstances, Causes and Conditions
Victims also have the right to the truth about the circumstances, events and causes surrounding human rights violations.46 The Basic Principles and Guidelines promote access to information so that victims may seek and obtain information on the causes leading to their victimization and on the causes and conditions pertaining to the gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law and to learn the truth.47 The statute creating the LTRC, for example, authorizes the LTRC to investigate the root causes, circumstances, factors, context, motives and perspectives which led to such violations.48
The LTRC correctly realized that the Liberian diaspora contained a spectrum of information important to the TRC process. As in many diasporas, the mix of individuals who could provide information was rich, ranging from former government officials to refugees who fled small villages. Importantly, many of these people had information about the early years predating the civil wars. The LTRC's period of time for examination began in 1979, a year prior to the military coup that brought Samuel Doe to power and a decade prior to the start of the civil war. As the LTRC conducted its work, it was clear there was an information gap regarding those early years. Former officials from the Tolbert government had fled the country, and many were in the US. Inclusion of the diaspora population enabled the LTRC to access information from these individuals. For example, at public hearings held in the US, former Liberian Vice-President Bennie Warner testified about the events leading up to the 1980 coup. A daughter of executed Liberian President William Tolbert, who now lives in the US, testified about her own and her family's experiences in the days following the coup. Several other individuals who had left Liberia early on in the LTRC mandate period testified about their involvement in the civil unrest in 1979, guarding high-level political prisoners, working with Charles Taylor (who would later become one of the most infamous warlords of the Liberian conflict) when he was a Tolbert government minister, and so on.
Testimony was also gathered about the diaspora's role in the conflict. For example, it was revealed at diaspora public hearings that, one month before President Tolbert was assassinated in the 1979 coup, representatives of a diaspora community organization, the Union of Liberian Associations in America (ULAA), met with Tolbert in Monrovia; the delegation included Charles Taylor.49 The ULAA representatives presented to President Tolbert a statement expressing the role in which diaspora populations often see themselves in relation to their homeland.
[C]an it not be argued, and persuasively so, that those Liberians such as we are, who have traveled and lived abroad, and who have had the opportunity to observe and experience the mechanics and dynamics of other social, economic, and political systems ... have a clear and inescapable responsibility ... to deal with and speak out unequivocally on the multiple problems that now grip our common country and people?50
Former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen testified in the LTRC's diaspora hearings about the role that Liberians in the US played in shaping policy toward Liberia's regimes. For example, upon hearing reports of human rights violations by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the US government sent US Army officers in January 1990 to observe AFL forces and advise them against further human rights abuses.51 The Liberian community in the US, however, contended that sending these officers signaled support for President Doe, and the two officers were removed from Liberia.52 According to Cohen, pressure from diaspora Liberians was the primary reason that the officers were removed.53
The LTRC's joint effort with The Advocates to provide a systematic opportunity for Liberians in the diaspora to participate enabled it to document a more thorough and accurate portrait of the events and issues it was mandated to address.
The Right to Reparation
Diaspora involvement also must be considered by truth commissions as it relates to the right to reparation. Victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law are entitled to adequate, effective and prompt reparation.54 This includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition.55 The UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers states that truth is both a requisite for determining responsibilities and the first step in the process of reparation.56
Truth commissions often create the framework to vindicate the right to reparation. Many truth commission mandates explicitly require them to make recommendations related to reparations and, at times, to address the post-Commission implementation. Truth commissions often recommend how victims should be defined, what violations warrant reparations, and the parameters of these reparations. Truth commissions also make community-level recommendations by addressing corruption, poverty reduction and weak governance structures as causes of conflict. The statute creating the LTRC, for example, specifically authorizes recommendations regarding reparations.57
Constituent participation is crucial in the development of reparations, which should include the input of victims to ensure their relevance, as well as the views of the wider population to be seen as justifiable.58 Liberian victims in the diaspora, many of whom maintain Liberian citizenship, are no less entitled to reparations than are their compatriots in Liberia. Accordingly, they should be entitled to consultation in the process by which reparations schemes are developed.
Systematic engagement with the diaspora enabled the LTRC to reach out to victims who otherwise would not have been able to engage in the process. For economic or immigration-related reasons, many Liberians who provided information to the LTRC Diaspora Project would not have been able to travel to Liberia to participate. For example, under US law, asylees who voluntarily return to their country of origin jeopardize their legal immigration status in the US. Effectively engaging these individuals would have been impossible without the diaspora component.
Technology can assist truth commissions in this systematic engagement to a certain extent. However, both the LTRC and the Sierra Leone TRC reported little success in gathering testimony through online mechanisms. Web-based statement taking went virtually unused in both contexts,59 suggesting that even in today's tech-savvy environment personal interaction remains the most powerful tool for investigating human rights violations.
The LTRC process revealed that diaspora populations may have different yet still meaningful needs to articulate to a truth commission. Liberians living in diaspora and Liberians who remained in Liberia may suggest very different recommendations related to property restitution. While both groups lost property as a result of displacement, they may view the option of restitution very differently based on where they live. Truth commissions must consider both perspectives, however, given that both groups have a stake in the eventual reparations process.
As a subset of the diaspora, refugees also have an important role to play in developing recommendations. Refugee statements highlight violations that took place during flight or because of breakdowns in the international refugee protection system. For example, victims in Buduburam refugee settlement may have needs specific to their status as refugees. Reparations for these populations may come, at least in part, in the form of humane and dignified repatriation schemes or negotiations between the home country and host countries relative to immigration and repatriation issues. All are valid forms of reparation that should be considered as part of a truth commission process.
Furthermore, garnering political and popular support requires the public to comprehend the violations as well as the basis for the reparations.60 If the diaspora population is unaware of the reasons behind the reparations, and arguably the transitional justice process as a whole, any recommendations may potentially lose a significant pool of support. By holding public hearings in the US, Liberians were able to attend and hear in person from victims, expert witnesses and the LTRC commissioners. By bringing the process to the diaspora, these public hearings provided a transparent platform to inform the Liberian and US community about the violations and the need for reparations.
The basic tenet underlying the vindication of victims rights through a truth-seeking process is that of participation. The composition of the participants in truth commissions impacts the outcome of the process, including what truth is told, how reparations are conceptualized, who qualifies for reparations and who is brought to justice. Future truth commissions will need to evaluate these legal considerations in the context of other practical arguments for diaspora engagement. In the next section, we describe some of these practical considerations, such as the economic and political role of diasporas, the impact of a truth-seeking process within the diaspora itself, and the role of TRC processes in educating international audiences about human rights and country-specific issues.
| Practical Arguments for Diaspora Participation |
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Apart from considering possible legal obligations, nations planning transitional justice processes should also consider the practical policy implications of diaspora engagement. Again, these implications are context specific, but the LTRC process demonstrates that diaspora engagement can have an array of effects on diaspora groups themselves, on resident nationals and on host-country nationals. These impacts are difficult to predict, control and evaluate but are nonetheless worthy of consideration as postconflict states examine all tools available to progress toward peaceful, stable development. Primary among these tools is the growing economic and political power of diasporas.
Economic and Political Power of Diasporas
Diaspora populations are one of the primary and most stable funders of developing economies. The World Bank reports that officially recorded remittance flows to developing countries were double that of official development aid, and they are on the rise.61 Recognizing the critical role of remittances, the brain-drain phenomenon and other effects of migration, the international development community has begun actively courting and engaging diasporas in service of development goals. USAID, for example, has established a Diaspora Networks Alliance to engage diaspora communities more effectively in the development process.62 The UN Institute for Training and Research recently focused one of its Migration and Development training seminars on the role of diasporas in peacebuilding.63
In Africa, regional actors and postconflict governments have been working in new and innovative ways to facilitate diaspora engagement. In 2008, the African Union (AU) began the process of designating the diaspora as a Sixth African Region and developing modalities for Diaspora participation in the organs and activities of the Union.64 In 2007, the government of Sierra Leone established an Office of the Diaspora to lay the foundation for a productive and mutually beneficial partnership between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Diaspora.65
During the LTRC, both those in Liberia and those in the diaspora were keenly aware of the role of remittances. Although data on Liberian remittances is scarce, one study reported that more than 72 percent of Liberian households in the US send remittances;66 community leaders report that the number is even higher.67 The study reported that the total annual remittances from the US to Liberia are between US$19 million and US$23 million, with another US$10 million to US$13 million going to Liberians in the West African subregion.68
Not only are diasporas sending individual remittances, but they are an emerging philanthropic force. In the Liberian diaspora, individuals and groups have established small-scale philanthropic endeavors throughout Liberia. These range from funding scholarship programs, to building wells and bridges, and to sending supplies to schools and hospitals. Liberians in the US spoke repeatedly during the LTRC process about these efforts, and sought to find effective ways to help Liberia's redevelopment. The recommendations they made to the LTRC reflected concerns about corruption and governance issues that would hinder efforts at diaspora involvement in rebuilding. Understanding these types of networks would be important in many postconflict contexts and could feed into truth commission recommendations.69
Because of their economic power, diasporas also wield significant political power. Once immigrants leave their country of origin, they rarely sever all ties to home. Researchers describe a subset of a diaspora known as transnationals or long-distance nationals. These are individuals, living in various geographical locations, who share a set of identity claims and practices that connect [them] to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home.70 Additionally, transnationals are those who establish sets of practices designed to influence the political situation within a territory that they still call home.71 When considering the power of diaspora populations in the field of transitional justice, this concept is particularly apt.
Similar to many forced-migrant communities, the Liberian diaspora played, and continues to play, a key role in events back home. Liberia researcher Mary Moran contends that to ignore the role of the diaspora, particularly in the US, is to tell only half the story when it comes to Liberia's decline into conflict and its road to peace.72 As Moran points out, the diaspora's role in Liberian business, policy and politics is not only a postconflict phenomenon.
For example, women in the diaspora also played a notable peacemaking role during the final years of the war. Liberian women activists successfully staged nonviolent protests to demand a meeting with Charles Taylor as part of their efforts to bring the war to an end. When faction leaders met in Ghana for peace talks, Liberian activists traveled there to mobilize women in that diaspora. By engaging Liberian refugee women in Ghana, activists established a formidable cadre of women to sit-in at the peace talks and bar faction leaders from leaving until an agreement was reached.73
After the peace accords, Liberians in the US and other countries actively campaigned for various candidates in the 2005 elections. Stories abound in the Liberian diaspora of resettled Liberians attempting to influence the elections by conditioning remittances on votes for certain candidates. The Liberian government issued a directive that campaigning outside of Liberia was prohibited by election laws in response to the very active organizing being waged by candidates for the 2005 elections in diaspora communities.74 The activity of the Liberian diaspora in 2005 is demonstrative of the transnational power of diasporas generally.
Liberia's diaspora is hardly unique in its long-distance power brokering, whether positive or negative. The diaspora's current political power is reflective of the significant role it played during the conflict and the role it likely will continue to play in Liberia's future. Recognition of this important diaspora role allowed the LTRC to document and explore this aspect of Liberia's past and future national identity. For example, the LTRC final report recommended that diaspora Liberians be allowed to hold dual citizenship and vote in Liberia.75 Engaging the diaspora's participation, as well as its support, is critical to shaping Liberia's transition and development.
Impact of Truth Commission Processes within the Diaspora
Engaging a diaspora in a truth commission process can also have important effects within the diaspora group itself. Systematic LTRC engagement with the Liberian diaspora highlighted the role of diaspora Liberians in Liberia's future. While the parameters of that role were open for debate during the LTRC process, the discussion itself was beneficial both for the LTRC and the diaspora. Diaspora engagement also provided opportunities for dialogue on other issues, including the ongoing effects of trauma and conflict within diaspora communities, the relationship and networks between Liberian communities around the world, refugee and immigration policy breakdowns, and how reconciliation could proceed in a diaspora setting. During outreach events across the US, the LTRC brought Liberians together for discussion and debate, in some cases for the first time since the war. Because of lingering animosity from the conflict, some of these individuals were unwilling to be in the same room together; in some cases, however, the LTRC's outreach efforts overcame that hostility and initiated dialogue. Moreover, the LTRC Diaspora Project connected Liberians and Liberian diaspora organizations to local services, such as pro bono immigration assistance and mental health services. For example, with input from The Advocates, a community organization in New York is working with one of The Advocates pro bono partners to establish a legal assistance clinic for Liberians on Staten Island.
Along with these positive outcomes, the LTRC Diaspora Project also revealed the divisions present in many diaspora communities. Although the conflict has ended in Liberia, residual tensions have developed into a new form of infighting and resentment found among some community members. Without the formal LTRC process, the need for community reconciliation efforts among diaspora groups likely would not have been formally documented nor mentioned in the TRC's final report.76 This documentation is already being used by The Advocates to develop programs to accelerate reconciliation in the diaspora.
Educating Host-Country Nationals about Human Rights and Justice
Apart from engaging diaspora populations, another potential benefit of a diaspora process is engagement of host-country nationals. The Advocates mobilized more than 800 volunteers to assist in statement taking, public hearings, research and outreach. Volunteers went through extensive training that exposed them to Liberian history and culture, the Liberian civil wars, human rights and humanitarian law, and the role of the US and other international actors in the Liberian crises.77 Volunteers traveled to Ghana to take statements while others traveled to Liberia to meet with the LTRC and conduct fact-finding.78 Volunteer statement takers met with individual Liberians – often for hours at a time – to hear why they left home, the human rights abuses they suffered, opinions about the Liberian conflict, and what justice and reconciliation measures are needed. Other volunteers attended the US public hearings to assist and listen to testimony. Direct engagement of so many non-Liberians with an African truth commission process was a powerful educational tool.
Apart from individual engagement, conducting truth commission activities on foreign soil also generated media coverage about the Liberian crisis, the refugee populations created by the civil wars, and international justice generally. For example, the New York Times published a front-page story about Liberian refugees in Staten Island who were involved with the LTRC Diaspora Project.79 Absent a diaspora component, the LTRC process almost certainly would not have received such coverage in mainstream US media.
One immediate positive effect of such awareness-raising was on Liberians immigration status in the US. In conjunction with its truth commission work, The Advocates conducted advocacy on extension of Liberians Temporary Protected Status80 and Deferred Enforced Departure81 status twice throughout the project's tenure. As a result of the LTRC Diaspora Project, more non-Liberians likely were aware of the impending DED expiration for Liberians and contacted their elected officials to ask for TPS/DED extension. In March 2009, the US government extended DED for 12 months.
The long-term impact of these collateral benefits from a truth commission process is difficult to measure. Nevertheless, because the LTRC and The Advocates expanded the LTRC's mandate into the diaspora, many more non-Liberians are aware of the LTRC process and the human rights violations that occurred in Liberia.
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Although there are strong legal and practical rationales for including diaspora groups in truth commission processes, feasibility is a concern. Truth commissions have historically planned to accomplish more than their time and resources allow. Most commissions must pare down their goals and narrow their work plans. The LTRC Diaspora Project demonstrates that creative approaches can expand a truth commission's potential without substantially impacting the budget or timeline. Partnerships and models that are outside the norms of past practice or what is expected by the international community should be actively considered.
The LTRC presents one such operational model, but there are doubtless others which will be considered in the future and raise new issues: Under whose control should diaspora engagement fall? What role should international NGOs play as implementing partners? What obligations do transitional justice actors have to engage diasporas? Answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this paper and should be the project of transitional justice scholars and nations in transition.
Lack of funding, absence of a mandate and skepticism from international partners in Liberia constrained development of the LTRC's ambitions for diaspora engagement. With those constraints, a partnership with an NGO that could mobilize pro bono labor was the only effective model for enabling Liberians in the diaspora to participate in Liberia's truth-seeking process. With the successful completion of the LTRC Diaspora Project, these types of concerns may be less of a driver in future processes.
The LTRC Diaspora Project demonstrated that systematic engagement of a diaspora population in a truth commission process is relevant, feasible and important. In addition, it has proved important to the victims, witnesses and other individuals who suffered or had loved ones suffer or lost during the conflict. By affirmatively including them as part of the process, the LTRC acknowledged the significance of their experiences as well as their role in moving Liberia forward. As future transitional justice mechanisms assess potential contributions – and drawbacks – of diaspora engagement, reflecting on the LTRC process can guide decision makers in asking the right questions about the distant voices of the diaspora.
1 Act to Establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of Liberia, Mandate, art. IV, sec. 4 (enacted by the National Transitional Legislative Assembly, 12 May 2005). ![]()
2 See, Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariez Currena, eds., Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). ![]()
3 The term diaspora derives from the Greek word diaspeirein and traditionally means to sow over or scatter. The modern meaning includes forced expulsion of a given population, dispersal, persecution, a sense of loss and a vision of return. Steven Vertovec, Migration Fundamentals: The Political Importance of Diasporas (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, June 2005). ![]()
4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2005 Statistical Yearbook (Geneva: UN Publications, 2007). Liberia's population in 2008 was estimated to be 3,489,072. Government of the Republic of Liberia, 2008 National Population and Housing Census: Preliminary Results (Monrovia: Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services, June 2008). ![]()
5 This number is based on an estimate of all Liberians, registered or unregistered by the UNHCR, living in Buduburam in 2007, as reported by the Liberian Refugee Welfare Council. The UNHCR reported almost 27,000 officially registered Liberian refugees remaining in Buduburam as of March 2008. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Ghana: Deportation to Liberia (briefing notes, 25 March 2008). ![]()
6 The Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas (ULAA) estimates the number to be 450,000. See, Rob Crilly, Expatriates Bet on Future Stability of Liberia: End of 14-Year Civil War Beckons Back Many Who Left Long Ago for America, USA Today, 6 February 2006. See also, Stephen C. Lubkemann, Remittance Relief and Not-Just-for-Profit Entrepreneurship: The Case of Liberia, in Diasporas and Development: Exploring the Potential, ed. Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), citing variable estimates between 10,000 and 450,000. ![]()
7 Lubkemann, supra n 6. The Office of Refugee Resettlement estimates that almost 5,000 Liberian refugees were resettled in Minnesota between 1983 and 2006. Office of Refugee Resettlement (US Department of Health and Human Services), Arrivals by Country and State of Initial Resettlement, FY 1983–2006, Report to Congress: FY 2006. Estimates from Liberian diaspora groups of the actual Liberian population residing in Minnesota are approximately 30,000. ![]()
8 Robin Dunn-Marcos, Konia T. Kollehlon, Bernard Ngovo and Emily Russ, Liberians: An Introduction to Their History and Culture (Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics, 2005), 2. ![]()
9 The Liberian Embassy in the UK has been working with the British government to evaluate whether West Africans who entered the UK claiming to be Liberian were actually from other West African countries but traveling on fake Liberian passports to receive benefits offered to Liberian asylum seekers. Personal communication, Philip D. E. Gbadyu, minister counselor for press, culture and tourism at the Embassy of the Republic of Liberia, UK, 27 September 2007. ![]()
10 The mission of The Advocates for Human Rights is to implement international human rights standards in order to promote civil society and reinforce the rule of law. By involving volunteers in research, education and advocacy, the organization builds broad constituencies in the US and select global communities. ![]()
11 The Advocates for Human Rights, A House with Two Rooms: Final Report of the TRC of Liberia Diaspora Project (2009), http://liberiatrc.mnadvocates.org/Final_Report.html [hereinafter A House with Two Rooms]. ![]()
12 This includes statements gathered by Advocates staff and volunteers, as well as statements taken by LTRC staff and Liberian refugees trained as statement-takers in Buduburam refugee settlement, that were entered into The Advocates database. ![]()
13 More data about statements taken in the diaspora can be found in appendix H of A House with Two Rooms, supra n 11. ![]()
14 A House with Two Rooms, supra n 11. ![]()
16 Diaspora Contribution to Reparation Trust Fund and Development Programs, in Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, Consolidated Final Report, vol. II (unedited version), 298, para. 19.4 (June 2009), https://www.trcofliberia.org/reports/final/final-report/trc-of-liberia-final-report-volume-ii.pdf. ![]()
17 The memorandum can be found in appendix E of A House with Two Rooms, supra n 11. ![]()
18 For example, The Advocates focused outreach on specific venues, including Liberian national conventions, sporting events, churches, apartment buildings, Liberian retail venues and the Internet. ![]()
19 Some diaspora statements were excluded from analysis in Liberia because of time and resource limitations. Although 1,631 statements were included in The Advocates Diaspora Project database, Benetech, the LTRC's technical partner responsible for statistical analysis of statements, reported that 1,165 diaspora statements were included in its analysis. This number reportedly includes 31 statements gathered in Nigeria, which were not part of The Advocates diaspora statement-taking effort. See, Kristen Cibelli, Amelia Hoover and Jule Krüger, Descriptive Statistics from Statements to the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Benetech Human Rights Program, June 2009), http://www.hrdag.org/resources/publications/Benetech-TRC-descriptives-2009–07-03.pdf. ![]()
20 A complete list of public hearing witnesses can be found in appendix I of A House with Two Rooms, supra n 11. Video of testimony from the diaspora hearings is available at https://www.trcofliberia.org/memorials/videos/video_search. ![]()
21 Article VIII, sec. 30, of the statute establishing the LTRC states that the Commission shall grant immunity to all persons or groups of persons, organizations, or institutions from prosecution or tort actions on account of statements made or evidence given before the TRC ... and which therefore, shall not be used in any court of law against the person making the statement. This statutory provision has no force outside of Liberia and the Advocates could not make any guarantee of immunity from prosecution to those in the diaspora who provided statements to the LTRC. ![]()
22 Kenya and Zimbabwe both have emerging transitional justice activity and significant, diverse diasporas. As of 2003, there were an estimated 47,000 Kenyans in the US alone. Kenneth Okoth, Kenya: What Role for Diaspora in Development? (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, August 2003). There are an estimated three million Zimbabweans in South Africa, not to mention the many in the UK and elsewhere. Scott Baldauf, Zimbabweans Face Hate in South Africa, Christian Science Monitor, 20 May 2008. ![]()
23 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1997). ![]()
24 Aderanti Adepoju, Creating a Borderless West Africa: Constraints and Prospects for Intra-Regional Migration, in Migration without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People, ed. Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire (Netherlands: Berghahn Books, 2007). ![]()
25 See, appendix H of A House with Two Rooms, supra n 11. ![]()
26 For more information about the composition and experiences of the Liberian diaspora, see, chapter 13 of A House with Two Rooms, supra n 11. ![]()
27 Nina Glick Schiller, Long-Distance Nationalism, in The Encyclopedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Communities Around the World, ed. Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember and Ian Skoggard (New York: Springer, 2009). ![]()
28 Joanna Quinn, Haiti's Failed Truth Commission: Lessons in Transitional Justice (working paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association annual meeting, Transitional Justice I: Truth and Reconciliation, 30 May 2007, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan). ![]()
29 Susan Harris-Rimmer, Reconceiving Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons as Transitional Justice Actors, April 2009 (paper on file with author). It has been reported that the CAVR also considered holding hearings abroad, but these hearings would have been focused on international policy makers, not Timorese living in the diaspora. See, LaoHamutuk Bulletin 4(5) (2003), http://www.etan.org/lh/bulletins/bulletinv4n5.html#cavrstructure. ![]()
30 Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, vol. 1 (Accra: Graphic Packaging Ltd., 2004) [hereinafter Witness to Truth]. ![]()
31 Ibid. Another source, who worked with the Sierra Leone TRC process, reported that hundreds of refugees provided testimony to the Sierra Leone TRC. Personal communication, Ozonnia Ojielo, 13 May 2009. ![]()
32 These state obligations have been affirmed by the UN Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 31 on Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (2004), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13; by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment in the case of X and Y v. The Netherlands (March 1985); and by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in the case of The Social and Economic Rights Action Center v. Nigeria (2001). ![]()
33 First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 32–33 (noting the right of families to know the fate of their relatives and obliging parties to conflicts to search for those reported missing). ![]()
34 UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (adopted 21 March 2006), A/RES/60/147 (Hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines). ![]()
35 Pablo de Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). ![]()
36 Article 8, Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra n 34. ![]()
37 Ibid. See also, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, UN Doc. A/RES/61/177 (2006), art. 24(1) (defining a victim as any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced disappearance). ![]()
38 Few perpetrators came forward in the US and the UK, despite the fact that anonymous statements were encouraged in both regions. In Ghana, more perpetrators were willing to come forward after specific outreach to a community-based organization formed by former child soldiers. As a matter of TRC policy, no incentives were provided for perpetrators, or any other individual, to provide a statement to the TRC. ![]()
39 Cibelli, Hoover and Krüger, supra n 19. ![]()
40 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 32, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978); and Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, Principle 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (2005). See also article 33, which obligates states parties to search for missing persons. ![]()
41 Almeida de Quinteros et al v. Uruguay, 21 July 1998, CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981, para. 14; Sarma v. Sri Lanka, 31 July 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000, para. 9.5. ![]()
42 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, Nothing Left to Lose: The Legacy of Armed Conflict and Liberia's Children (June 2004). ![]()
43 Human Rights Watch, How to Fight, How to Kill (2004). Approximately 21,000 child soldiers required demobilization according to a 2004 report; see, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Global Report 2004—Liberia. ![]()
44 See, chapter 14 of A House with Two Rooms, supra n 11. ![]()
45 At the time of writing, the LTRC had released an unedited version of its final report that did not include any recommendations on family tracing or reunification. ![]()
46 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Diane Orentlicher, Principle 4, The Victim's Right to Know, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (8 February 2005). ![]()
48 Article 26(a)(i), Act to Establish the TRC of Liberia, supra n 1. ![]()
49 Bai Gbala, Testimony at the Diaspora Public Hearings of the TRC of Liberia, St. Paul, Minn., USA (12 June 2008) (transcript on file with author). ![]()
50 Speech by Bai Gbala, president of the ULAA, at a meeting with President Tolbert, Executive Mansion, Monrovia, 11 March 1980. ![]()
51 Herman Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). See also, Herman J. Cohen, undersecretary for African affairs, public hearings testimony, 12 June 2008. ![]()
52 Nancee Oku Bright (Global Connections), interview with former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman J. Cohen, Liberia, February 2000, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/globalconnections/liberia/film/hermancohen.html. Cohen explains that the Liberian community in the US was up in arms about the two army officers. ![]()
53 Herman J. Cohen, public hearings testimony, 12 June 2008. ![]()
54 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra n 34 at art. 11(b). ![]()
55 Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra n 34 at art. 18. ![]()
56 Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Independence of the Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity, para. 17, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/52 (2006). ![]()
57 Act to Establish the TRC of Liberia, supra n 1 at sec. 26(j)(i). ![]()
58 International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Reparations in Theory and Practice (2007). ![]()
59 Despite extensive pretesting, outreach to diaspora communities and security guarantees, the LTRC's online statement taking generated only a few statements. Personal communication, Michael Best, Georgia Institute of Technology, 24 August 2009. The Sierra Leone web-based statement process generated none. See, Witness to Truth, supra n 30. ![]()
61 Sanjeev Gupta, Catherine Pattillo and Smita Wagh, Making Remittances Work for Africa, Finance and Development: A quarterly magazine of the IMF 44(2) (June 2007). ![]()
62 See, USAID, Diaspora Engagement: Remittances and Beyond, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/gda/remittances.html. ![]()
63 More information is available at http://www.unitar.org/ny/international-law-and-policy/migration-and-development-series. ![]()
64 Decision on the Representation of the African Diaspora at Assemblies of the African Union, Doc. EX.CL/406(XII) Add.1, 12th Ordinary Council (25–29 January 2008). ![]()
65 See, Sierra Leone Office of the Diaspora, http://www.diasporaaffairs.gov.sl/. ![]()
67 Personal interview, Doris Parker, executive director of the Liberian Women's Initiative – Minnesota (LIWIM), Minneapolis, USA, 1 August 2008. ![]()
69 See generally, Michael Fullilove, World-Wide Webs: Diasporas and the International System (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2008). ![]()
70 Schiller, supra n 27 at 570. ![]()
72 Mary H. Moran, Time and Place in the Anthropology of Events: A Diaspora Perspective on the Liberian Transition, Anthropological Quarterly 78(2) (2005): 457–464. ![]()
73 Pray the Devil Back to Hell, DVD, directed by Gini Reticker (Fork Films, 2008). ![]()
75 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia: Consolidated Final Report, vol. II (unedited version) (June 2009). ![]()
77 Training materials and video recordings of the nine-hour volunteer training sessions are available at http://liberiatrc.mnadvocates.org/Current_Volunteers.html. ![]()
78 Volunteers who undertook international travel with The Advocates paid their own expenses for transport, lodging, food and other incidentals. ![]()
79 Ellen Barry, From Staten Island Haven, Liberians Reveal War's Scars, New York Times, 18 September 2007. ![]()
80 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is an immigration status that may be granted temporarily to immigrants from specific countries because of a war or other extraordinary situation. See, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Temporary Protected Status (30 March 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=609d3591ec04d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=609d3591ec04d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD. The US has extended TPS status to Liberians since 1991, and the Department of Homeland Security terminated this status effective 1 October 2007. Since then, Presidents Bush and Obama have granted Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) status to eligible Liberians in the US. Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians, as granted by President Obama, will expire on 31 March 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Deferred-Enforced-Departure-for-Liberians/. ![]()
81 DED is an executive action that can block enforced removal of immigrants from the US for a specific amount of time. See, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, Deferred Enforced Departure – Liberia (30 March 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=8c25f90517e15110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD. ![]()
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